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THE COMMON CARRIER BARRIER:
AN ANALYSIS OF STANDARD OF CARE
REQUIREMENTS, INSURANCE POLICIES,
AND LIABILITY REGULATIONS FOR
RIDE-SHARING COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smartphone technology has not only maximized the
amount of service offerings to consumers but has also enabled the av-
erage consumer to become a service provider.1  Entrepreneurs are
now able to forgo many of the time consuming and expensive hassles
that starting a business entails2 by taking part in the rising “sharing
economy” in which people rent and share their resources, such as
rooms in their houses, rides in their cars, or even their time and skill
sets.3  Ride-sharing enables individuals to share a seat in their car for a
fee or a “donation”4 and has become a popular service in the sharing
economy.5  Transportation network companies (TNCs), such as Lyft,
Sidecar, and Uber, provide a technological platform that connects
drivers with customers who are seeking a ride.6  Riders are joined
“with drivers using their phones’ GPS, much like a taxi company’s
1. See generally Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the
Sharing Economy, BOS. B.J., Spring 2014, http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-li
brary/boston-bar-journal-spring-2014-edition.pdf (describing the various types of sharing plat-
forms and the issues involved with operating and utilizing these services).
2. See Timothy Sandefur, A Public Convenience and Necessity and Other Conspiracies Against
Trade: A Case Study from the Missouri Moving Industry, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 159, 159
(2014) (“Accumulating capital, hiring talent, buying insurance, doing market research—all these
tasks and more make opening a small business among the hardest things a person can ever
attempt.”).
3. See RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF COLLABO-
RATIVE CONSUMPTION XV (2010) (coining the term “collaborative consumption,” which includes
“traditional sharing, bartering, lending, trading, [and] renting . . . redefined through technology
and peer communities”); Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1; All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, R
ECONOMIST: TECH Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE), Mar. 9, 2013, at 13–15.
4. Stephanie Francis Ward, ‘App’ Me a Ride, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13, 13.
5. Gwynedd Stuart, Can Chicago’s Taxi Industry Survive the Rideshare Revolution?, CHI.
READER (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/rideshare-chicago-uber-lyft-
uberx-taxi-industry-cab-drivers-extinct/Content?oid=15165161.
6. John G. Browning, Conning the IADC Newsletters: Emerging Technology and Its Impact on
Automotive Litigation, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 84 (2014); see Manzo v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13 C
2407, 2014 WL 3495401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
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dispatch system would send the nearest available cab.”7  Although
many consumers have enjoyed this new mode of transportation and
the lower fares it brings,8 legislators, insurance companies, and courts
are trying to tackle safety and regulatory concerns, insurance issues,
and rising lawsuits, respectively.9
Only a few jurisdictions and municipalities have tried to ban ride-
sharing services outright;10 however, many jurisdictions, and especially
courts, grapple with determining how to treat ride-sharing operators
compared to licensed taxi drivers.11  While courts in almost all juris-
dictions have yet to answer the question of what standard of care
should apply to ride-sharing services,12 a variety of states have en-
acted, or are in the process of enacting, statutes that expressly exclude
ride-sharing services from being considered common carriers.13  In
2014, former Illinois Governor Pat Quinn vetoed the proposed H.B
4075 bill, which would have amended the Illinois Vehicle Code as well
7. Browning, supra note 6, at 84. R
8. See Stuart, supra note 5. R
9. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1; Harrison Weber, As Uber Battles 13 Lawsuits, Cab- R
bies & State Agencies Are Out for Blood (Update), VENTUREBEAT, http://venturebeat.com/2014/
05/08/as-uber-battles-13-lawsuits-cabbies-state-agencies-are-out-for-blood/ (last updated May 8,
2014, 10:20 AM).
10. See, e.g., Luz Lazo, Virginia Reaches Deal with Uber, Lyft, To Allow Services To Operate
in the State, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/20
14/08/06/virginia-reaches-deal-with-uber-lyft-to-allow-services-to-operate-in-the-state/ (describ-
ing an agreement between Virginia officials and TNCs, which allowed ride-sharing services to
legally operate after a cease and desist order was issued in June 2014); Jon Brooks, City by City,
Lyft and Uber Take on Taxis, Regulators, KQED NEWS (Mar. 3, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/
2014/03/03/lyft-uber-regulation/ (stating that New Orleans, Miami, and Portland have banned the
services); Ross Palombo, Miami-Dade Commissioners Approve UberX, Lyft Services, LO-
CAL10.COM, http://www.local10.com/news/miamidade-commissioners-approve-uberx-lyft-ser-
vices/26966748 (last updated July 15, 2014, 9:58 PM) (reporting on an initial vote by the Miami-
Dade Commissioner to move forward in legalizing ride-sharing services in Miami despite the
disappointment of angry taxi drivers).
11. See, e.g., Manzo, 2014 WL 3495401, at *4; Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 1338148, at *1–6 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014); City of Columbus v. Uber
Techs., No. 2014 EVH 060125, 2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 11, at *5–6 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Apr. 30,
2014).
12. In an administrative proceeding, the Maryland Public Service Commission recently held
that “Uber is a common carrier within the meaning prescribed by [Public Utilities Act] § 1-
101(e)(1)” because Uber “is engaged in the public transportation of persons for hire.” In re An
Investigation To Consider the Nature & Extent of Regulation over the Operations of Uber
Techs., Inc. & Other Similar Companies, Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order No. 86528, at 17–18
(Aug. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Order of Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n] (quoting MD. CODE ANN., Pub.
Util. § 1-101(e)(1) (LexisNexis 2015)).
13. See, e.g., S.B. 1457, Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2014) (“‘Call or demand service’ or ‘taxicab ser-
vice.’ Local common carrier service for passengers . . . .  The term shall not include transporta-
tion network services . . . .”); Dan Packel, Pa. Sen. Floats Bill To Legitimize Uber, Lyft Services,
LAW 360 (July 8, 2014, 1:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/555307/pa-sen-floats-bill-to-le-
gitimize-uber-lyft-services.
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as the Ride-Sharing Arrangement Act.14  The proposed bill set strict
requirements for ride-sharing services, such as “distinctive registration
plates issued by the Secretary of State.”15  Additionally, the bill would
have required “vehicle[s] used in commercial ridesharing arrange-
ments . . . to undergo the same safety tests that a unit of local govern-
ment requires for other vehicles used in transporting passengers for-
hire[,]”16 thus, closely aligning ride-sharing services with transporta-
tion services traditionally viewed as common carriers.  Generally,
common carriers are held to a higher standard of care, subjected to
liability for “even the slightest degree of negligence toward a fare-
paying passenger,” or are required to maintain “specific duties of
care.”17
This Comment contends that a ride-sharing driver’s liability should
be assessed under a lesser standard of care despite the fact that courts
should generally apply a uniform standard of care to commercial driv-
ing activities in the absence of clear legislation.  Moreover, the Illinois
legislature should affirmatively pass a bill excluding ride-sharing ser-
vices from common carrier definitions and imposing ride-sharing
friendly regulation similar to Pennsylvania S.B. 1457.18  Part II of this
Comment provides: (1) a conceptual outline of the sharing economy
as a whole; (2) a narrative on the development of ride-sharing compa-
nies and their business models; (3) a comparison of ride-sharing ser-
vices and traditional taxi services; (4) a brief explanation of the
common carrier standard of care and its historical purpose; (5) a
description of current and potential insurance issues ride-sharing driv-
ers face; (6) an account of courts’ general responses to ride-sharing
technology, liability, and standard of care issues; and (7) the legisla-
14. Dave McKinney, Quinn Nixes Uber Bill, Says It Would Be a Disservice to Consumers, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Aug. 25, 2014, http://chicago.suntimes.com/?p=160461 (discussing H.B. 4075, 98th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014)).
15. Ill. H.B. 4075.
16. Bill Status of HB 4075, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.
asp?DocNum=4075&GAID=12&DocTypeID=HB&SessionID=85&GA=98 (last updated Nov.
21, 2014) (vetoed).
17. 3–12A PREMISES LIABILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 12A.01–02 (2015).
18. See Packel, supra note 13; see also Michael Faure et al., The Regulator’s Dilemma: Caught R
Between the Need for Flexibility & the Demands of Foreseeability.  Reassessing the Lex Certa
Principle, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 283, 287–90 (explaining the difficulties and tensions be-
tween regulatory demands and technological advances, however, ultimately arguing for greater
legal certainty through less flexible regulations).  This Comment does not opine that ride-sharing
services and companies should not be regulated at all.  Indeed, legal certainty for ride-sharing
drivers, as well as safety and reliable service to the consumer, are important and necessary.
However, this cannot not be accomplished by forcing a new mode of transportation service into
an outdated regulatory scheme.
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tors’ responses to ride-sharing technology.19  Part III argues that ride-
sharing drivers may not be adequately informed about the heightened
standard of care and that although ride-sharing drivers may not pos-
sess training and experience equal to that of a taxi driver, a consumer
should have the freedom to accept a potentially lower safety standard
in exchange for lower fares.20  Additionally, Part III compares ride-
sharing services to dating websites and contends that, in the past,
courts have successfully abandoned common law standards for new
technological principles.21  Further, Part III proposes examples of
ride-sharing friendly legislation (excluding ride-sharing services from
the common carrier definition) and urges the Illinois legislature to af-
firmatively adopt a ride-sharing friendly bill.22  Part IV discusses the
impact of older laws on technological innovations and describes the
consequences that would likely follow if the law fails to adapt.23  Part
V concludes that classifying ride-sharing services as common carriers
will have a detrimental effect on the ride-sharing business model and
proposes alternative ways to enhance safety standards.24
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Concept of a Sharing Economy
In a sharing economy, or “peer economy,” consumers engage in col-
laborative consumption25 or “peer-to-peer services.”26  The sharing
economy began to rise in 2008 after the financial crisis, enabling con-
sumers to become “microentrepreneurs.”27  The financial crisis re-
shaped consumers’ approaches to owning and consumption.28  For
decades, consumers worked long hours and took on debt to own
houses, cars, and the latest household gadgets.29  The sharing econ-
omy now offers an alternative to ownership: instead of buying and
spending money on an item, collaborative consumption allows con-
19. See infra notes 25–140 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 141–76 and accompanying text. R
21. See infra notes 177–235 and accompanying text. R
22. See infra notes 206–43 and accompanying text. R
23. See infra notes 236–73 and accompanying text. R
24. See infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text. R
25. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at xv. R
26. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, at 13–15. R
27. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at xviii (citing L.S., Collaborative Consumption, R
ECONOMIST: BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010, 10:09 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/04/
peer—peer_car_rentals); Thomas L. Friedman, Welcome to the ‘Sharing Economy,’ N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2013, at SR11.
28. Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The LEGAL Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2 (2015).
29. See id. at 4.
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sumers to “have access to many things that [they] need without having
to own [or buy] them all by [them]selves.”30  Peer-to-peer services al-
low consumers to directly share their rooms,31 cars,32 time,33 and other
assets with consumers who are connected with them through the in-
ternet or smartphone technology.34  Consequently, the sharing econ-
omy enables consumers to access more but own less; in other words,
“access trumps ownership.”35  In their book What’s Mine Is Yours:
The Rise of Collaborative Consumption, Rachel Botsman and Roo
Rogers argued that a sharing economy has several benefits, such as
providing owners with the opportunity to profit from underused
assets.36
In addition to its economic impact, other scholars and journalists
see a cultural value in the sharing economy, arguing that peer-to-peer
type services enhance trust and create cohesiveness between fellow
citizens.37  Companies such as AirBnB, Lyft, Uber, and TaskRabbit
“act as matchmakers” between peers who are seeking and offering
services.38  Although some critics call the sharing economy “unregu-
lated, tech-enabled, supply-and-demand entrepreneurial capital-
ism[,]”39 the majority of scholars, thinkers, and bloggers agree that
peer-to-peer services have revolutionized consumers’ approaches to
sharing assets and business.40  As the sharing economy rises, so too
30. Id.
31. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (matchmaking service for
lodging).
32. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (personal transportation);
SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (outsourcing on-demand delivery for
food or other products); UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (matchmaking
service for personal transportation).
33. See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (matchmaking
service for assistance with, or performance of, tasks and chores).
34. See generally Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1 (describing the major sharing platforms R
and the issues involved in using these types of services).
35. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, at 13. R
36. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 83–84; see All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra R
note 3, at 13. R
37. See, e.g., Jason Tanz, How AirBnB and Lyft Finally Got Americans To Trust Each Other,
WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy
(“We are entrusting complete strangers with our most valuable possessions . . . .  This is not just
an economic breakthrough.  It is a cultural one, . . . a set of digital tools that enable and en-
courage us to trust our fellow human beings.”); see also e.g., All Eyes on the Sharing Economy,
supra note 3, at 14. R
38. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, at 13. R
39. Brad Truttle, Can We Stop Pretending That the Sharing Economy Is All About Sharing?,
TIME: MONEY.COM (June 30, 2014), http://time.com/money/2933937/sharing-economy-airbnb-
uber-monkeyparking/.
40. See, e.g., Friedman supra note 27, at SR11; All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, R
at 14 (“The idea of renting from a person rather than a faceless company will survive, even if the
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does the demand for regulation and legislative concerns.41  To provide
sufficient accountability between consumers and providers, many
“sharing-companies” have created a two-way rating system to create a
“self-enforcing form of consumer protection.”42 Additionally, almost
all peer-to-peer services involve an in-person service, taking away the
anonymity consumers experience when they transact via e-commerce
websites, such as Amazon or eBay.43  The service’s in-person nature
serves as a check against abuses of the services because, as psychologi-
cal studies point out, “we don’t mess with people we know.”44
Regulators, on the other hand, are not convinced and struggle with
this new service concept.45  More importantly, lobbyists of heavily reg-
ulated industries are demanding stricter regulations as those industries
begin to fear for their survival.46  However, one fact remains un-
changed: peer-to-peer services, with their convenience, accessibility,
and low costs, are growing in popularity among consumers.47  Al-
though the market and regulations for peer-to-peer services may
change, the demand for peer-to-peer services will likely remain.48
B. Ride-Sharing Technology
The ride-sharing revolution started with John Zimmer and Logan
Green’s 2008 California start-up “Zimride.”49  Zimride, through the
use of an online platform, intended to establish a “social layer of effi-
early idealism of the sharing economy does not.”).  “[T]his new sharing economy is the real deal
and will increasingly be a source of income for more and more people.”  Thomas L. Friedman,
And Now for a Bit of Good News . . ., N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014, at SR1.
41. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, at 15. R
42. Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1, at 7 (quoting Tom Keane, Opinion, Change Is Coming, R
and It’s with Smartphone Apps, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2013, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opin-
ion/2013/04/06/the-end-taxicab-medallion/S5aQXzCezcR6ByuehZygBN/story.html.).
43. Tanz, supra note 37. R
44. Id.
45. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, at 15. R
46. Emily Badger, Taxi Medallions Have Been the Best Investment in America for Years. Now
Uber May Be Changing That, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG, (June 20, 2014), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/20/taxi-medallions-have-been-the-best-investment-
in-america-for-years-now-uber-may-be-changing-that/.
47. All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, supra note 3, at 13. R
48. Id. at 15 (“The idea of renting from a person rather than a faceless company will survive,
even if the early idealism of the sharing economy does not.  The fact that regulators, tax collec-
tors and big companies are now sniffing around a model that has been embraced by millions of
people is a measure of its value and growth potential.”).
49. See Sam Gustin, Lyft: Ride Sharing Startup Zimride Hits the Gas Pedal in San Francisco,
TIME (Sept. 4, 2014), http://business.time.com/2012/09/04/need-a-lyft-ride-sharing-startup-
zimride-hits-the-gas-pedal/.  Contrary to popular belief, the name Zimride is inspired by Logan’s
personal experience with Zimbabwe’s transportation system as opposed to Zimmer’s last name.
Id.
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ciency on our current transportation infrastructure” by filling the
empty seats of the millions of cars that were driving on the roads on a
daily basis.50  Initially, Zimride aimed to appeal to and connect college
students because much of this population does not own cars and is
more likely to carpool.51  In 2012, Zimride launched its smartphone
app, “Lyft,” which enabled users to request a ride through their
smartphones.52  The concept of modern ride-sharing was born, and
Lyft’s competitors, such as  Sidecar and Uber, followed suit.53  Uber
initially connected off-duty taxi drivers and chauffeurs with customers;
however, Uber quickly expanded its service and added “UberX,”
which uses privately owned vehicles driven by private individuals who
provide cheaper driving services as compared to other transportation
services, such as taxicabs.54
TNCs, provide a technological platform that connects drivers with
customers seeking a ride.55  To summon a ride, customers access a free
smartphone app, which uses the phone’s GPS to determine the cus-
tomer’s location and then connects the customer to the nearest availa-
ble driver.56  Riders automatically pay at the end of their ride using
their credit card, which is linked to the ride-sharing app.57  The TNCs,
in turn, take “varying percentage[s] of fares.”58  Uber, for example,
charges its drivers “a  . . .  software license fee,”59 which provides the
driver with access to the smartphone app and its contents; however, in
return, Uber takes 20% of the driver’s fares.60  Uber also offers its
drivers the option of renting a phone from the company, but if the
drivers choose to do so, Uber charges a service fee, which is typically
$10 a week.61
Although services and fare structures may vary, each TNC seems to
stress that it is not a transportation carrier but, rather, a connection
tool between independent contractors and the app users.62  For exam-
50. Id. (quoting John Zimmer).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 1338144, at
*6 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2014), adopted in part and rejected in part by No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL
1338148 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014)); Browning, supra note 6, at 84–85. R
55. Browning, supra note 6, at 84. R
56. Id.
57. Ward, supra note 4, at 13. R
58. Id.
59. UBER, https://get.uber.com/cl/financing/ (follow “What does It Cost To Drive with Uber?”
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
60. See Lazo, supra note 10. R
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Browning, supra note 6, at 84 (describing Uber’s stance). R
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ple, on its website, Uber specifically refers to its drivers as “partners”
and advertises the concept of being “an independent contractor” to
potential drivers.63  Lyft, on the other hand, “considers itself an in-
ternet site[;]”64 however, it limits its drivers’ activity to “Lyft’s operat-
ing hours.”65  The requirements to become a ride-sharing driver are
similar across TNCs.  Most TNCs: (1) implement a minimum age re-
quirement; (2) require drivers to have a car of a certain category, type,
and model year; (3) require drivers to maintain personal liability in-
surance; (4) mandate drivers to undergo a background check; and (5)
implement a brief training for drivers.66  The TNCs argue that ride-
sharing drivers have a unique status and that these drivers and the
TNC business model should not fall under the same regulatory stan-
dards as that of traditional taxi drivers and companies.67
C. Ride-Sharing Technology Compared to Traditional Taxi Services
Traditional taxi drivers and companies are part of a heavily regu-
lated and highly political industry.68  Not only are taxi drivers held to
a higher standard of care and subject to mandatory drug testing as
well as special licensures, but large cities have established a compli-
cated system of regulation through “taxi medallion” requirements.69
Many large U.S. cities, such as Boston, Chicago, and New York, limit
the number of taxis allowed within city limits and require taxi drivers
to have a special license, or taxi medallion, “in addition to an individ-
ual taxicab driver’s license.”70  Because the supply of taxi medallions
is limited, “taxicab licenses often are bought and sold much like con-
ventional property rights in tangible things such as houses.”71  Indeed,
in Chicago, a taxi medallion costs approximately $350,000, allowing
taxi drivers to operate one of the 6,904 taxis in the city.72  The medal-
lion system mostly benefits large investors who finance the expensive
63. See UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015) (“Need something
outside the 9 to 5?  As an independent contractor with Uber, you’ve got freedom and flexibility
to drive whenever you have time.”).
64. Ward, supra note 4, at 14. R
65. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drivers (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).
66. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 4, at 14. R
67. E.g., City of Columbus v. Uber Techs., No. 2014 EVH 060125, 2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 11,
*5–6 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Apr. 30, 2014).
68. Badger, supra note 46. R
69. See generally id. (describing Chicago’s taxi medallion system).
70. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York Taxicab
Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 127 (2013).
71. Id.
72. Badger, supra note 46. R
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medallions and lease them to the actual taxi drivers.73  Lease fees can
run up to hundreds of dollars each week.74  Taxi medallions are
quickly losing their exclusivity and value because ride-sharing drivers
have entered the market and are not subject to the medallion require-
ment.75  The medallion system created barriers to entry that pre-
vented market competition—a system that is now threatened.76
Taxi medallions have not only been a great investment, but they
have also been used as policy tools.77  For example, in Boston, a hack-
ney carriage, also known as a taxicab, must have “a protective parti-
tion between the driver and the passenger, a taximeter that calculates
the fare and the distance traveled, an approved credit card machine
and a “two-way communication” system with “an approved dispatch
service.”78  Similarly, the Chicago Municipal Code sets vehicle safety
standards for taxis and requires taxi license applicants to “successfully
complete a mandatory course of study as prescribed and approved by
the commissioner.”79  In requiring applicants to fulfill certain features
to obtain or maintain a taxi-medallion, legislators and policy makers
are able to shape and create uniform safety standards and equipment
for taxicabs.80
Lastly, taxi drivers, as well as taxi companies, have historically been
defined as public common carriers, thus subjecting them to a higher
standard of care regarding liability.81  Public common carriers, for ex-
ample, may not discriminate against passengers and must undertake
“to transport any member of the general public, if the carrier has
space and unless it has a legal excuse for refusal to do so.”82  This is in
stark contrast to ride-sharing drivers who may choose their passengers
based on a two-way rating system.83
73. Id.; see Wyman, supra note 70, at 132 n.33. R
74. Badger, supra note 46. R
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see, e.g.,Wyman, supra note 70, at 133. R
78. Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42068, at *15 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2014).
79. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-112-100 (2014).
80. See, e.g., id. § 9-112-140 (“Licensees are required to equip all their taxicabs, while the
vehicles are operating as a taxicab, with at least one of the following safety features or combina-
tion of safety features . . .: (1) A safety shield device capable of completely separating the
driver’s seat from the rear passenger compartment; or (2) A mounted camera unit that will take
a visual record or photograph(s) of the passenger(s) . . . .”).
81. 26 PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 136.01 (Louis R. Frumer & Mel-
vin I. Friedman eds., 2015).
82. Id.
83. See Tanz, supra note 37.  Lyft, for example, provides drivers and riders with “the exact R
same scale and rating system[,]” allowing drivers and riders to rate each other on a scale from
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL203.txt unknown Seq: 10  2-AUG-16 10:10
882 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:873
D. The Common Carrier Standard of Care
Traditionally, a common carrier is an operator for hire who under-
takes to transport the general public.84
In order to qualify as a common carrier: (1) the carriage must be
part of the carrier’s business; (2) the carriage must be for hire or
remuneration; and (3) the carrier must represent to the general pub-
lic that the services are a part of the business in which the carrier is
engaged, and that the carrier is willing to serve the public in that
business.85
Historically, a common carrier was (1) obligated “to contract with
and serve all” who requested the common carrier’s services; (2) held
strictly liable for any type of damage or loss; and (3) “only exceptional
cases, such as an act of God” relieved a common carrier from strict
liability.86  In many jurisdictions that “apply the common carrier’s
heightened duty of care . . . liability [is] often imposed for even the
slightest degree of negligence [towards] fare-paying . . . passen-
ger[s].”87  Courts often define this standard of care as “imposing the
‘highest degree of care,’ ‘the utmost care,’ or ‘extraordinary care.’”88
Other jurisdictions have developed a “‘reasonable prudent carrier’
standard” of care, usually reaching the same result without “expressly
adopt[ing] the higher common carrier standard of care.”89  Legal
scholars have developed several theories regarding the purpose of the
common carrier’s classification and heightened standard of care.90  In
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood,91 the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that
“[i]n regulating the public establishment of common carriers, the great
object of the law was to secure the utmost care and diligence in the
performance of their important duties—an object essential to the wel-
fare of every civilized community.”92
1–5.  Matthew Ley, New Ride-Sharing Alternatives: Uber, Lyft Revolutionize Transportation,
CCNN LIVE (Jan. 21, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://ccnnlive.com/?p=1646.
84. 3 PREMISES LIABILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 12A.01–02 (Norman J. Landau & Edward
C. Martin eds., perm. ed., rev. vol. 2011).
85. 7 PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 23.03 (Louis R. Frumer & Melvin
I. Friedman eds., 2015).
86. Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers—Continuity and Disintegration in United States Trans-
portation Law, 13 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 3 (1983) (quoting OTTO KAHN-FREUND, THE LAW OF CAR-
RIAGE BY INLAND TRANSPORT 189–92 (3d ed. 1956)).
87. 3 PREMISES LIABILITY: LAW AND PRACTICE § 12A.02.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 12A.01.
91. 84 U.S. 357 (1873).
92. Id. at 377.
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In Illinois, examples of common carriers include railroad trains,93
elevators,94 and taxicabs.95  In determining whether a “carrier is a
common carrier,” Illinois courts ask “whether the carrier serves all of
the public alike.”96  Conversely, private carriers are described as a car-
rier that “transports only by special agreement, and is not bound to
serve every person who may apply.”97
E. Insurance Issues for Ride-Sharing Drivers
Assuring adequate insurance for ride-sharing drivers remains an
open issue.98  Although ride-sharing drivers are required to have per-
sonal insurance and ride-sharing companies typically provide drivers
with commercial coverage, not all policies cover damage to the actual
car.99  Some insurance companies, such as Geico and State Farm, have
emphasized that their personal automobile insurance policies exclude
commercial driving activities, and some insurers have even rejected
applicants that reported driving for a ride-sharing company.100  Due to
a tragic accident in San Francisco on New Year’s Eve 2013, which re-
sulted in the death of a six-year-old, Uber expanded its insurance cov-
erage, valued at $1 million, to include all drivers logged into the app
and available for a fare.101  In Yellow Group LLC v. Uber Techs.,
Inc.,102 a class of “taxi medallion owners, taxi affiliations, and livery
service providers” filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against Uber, alleging misrepresentations
of insurance coverage.103  The taxi affiliate’s complaint alleged that
93. See, e.g., Uebelein v. Chi. Transit Auth., 230 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (“[T]he
obligation of a [railroad] common carrier [as] to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight
can reasonably do, consistent with the mode of conveyance and the practical operation of the
road, to convey its passengers to their destinations in safety.”).
94. Shoemaker v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 543 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989).
95. Anderson v. Yellow Cab Co., 329 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
96. Doe v. Rockdale Sch. Dist., 679 N.E.2d 771, 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining the differ-
ence between common carriers and private carriers).
97. Id.
98. See Browning, supra note 6, at 85; Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1. R
99. David Berg, What Uber and Lyft Drivers Need To Know About Car Insurance, NOLO,
http://www.all-about-car-accidents.com/resources/what-uber-and-lyft-drivers-need-to-know-car-
insurance.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
100. See, e.g., R.J. Lehmann, Why Major Insurers Won’t Cover Uber, Lyft Drivers, S.F. EXAM-
INER (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/why-major-insurers-wont-cover-
uber-lyft-drivers/Content?oid=2909369.
101. Beth Winegarner, Uber Expands Drivers’ Insurance After Fatal Crash, LAW360 (Mar. 14,
2014, 8:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/518869/uber-expands-drivers-insurance-after-fa
tal-crash.
102. No. 12 C 1967, 2014 WL 3396055 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014).
103. Id. at *1–2.
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Uber falsely promised $1 million insurance coverage for UberX driv-
ers and passengers without actually providing any insurance coverage
to drivers and passengers.104  Although the court dismissed the plain-
tiffs’ claim for misrepresentation of insurance,105 legislators, legal
scholars, and legal professionals remain concerned about underin-
sured drivers.
Meanwhile, the Property Causality Insurers Association of America
has issued a “Transportation Network Company (Ride-Sharing) Issue
Status” in an effort to inform consumers of regulatory and legislative
updates regarding insurance policies and requirements.106  Some
states’ insurance departments have also issued consumer alerts, advis-
ing ride-sharing drivers that they may not be covered under their auto
insurance.107  In the event of a personal insurance policy rejecting
commercial driving activities, the driver would be forced to supple-
ment her insurance through a commercial policy.108  As a recent study
from a nonprofit public policy research organization, R Street Insti-
tute,109 pointed out: “rates for commercial auto insurance to cover liv-
ery services are unlikely to be affordable for most part-time drivers,
running in the range of $8,000 to $10,000 annually.”110  Moreover,
when R Street’s policy study asked “[r]epresentatives of several of the
nation’s largest auto insurers—including State Farm, Allstate, Pro-
gressive, USAA and Liberty Mutual—” if their “standard personal
lines [policies] . . . exclude[d]  coverage for commercial use[,]” each
insurer confirmed.111
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *14.  The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege an actual misrepresentation
because “Uber did not assert that it would provide the insurance policy to UberX drivers and
riders, rather that drivers and riders would be covered by at least $1 million or $2 million in
insurance.” Id.
106. PROP. CAUSALITY INSURERS ASS’N OF AM., TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY
(RIDE-SHARING) ISSUE STATUS (2014), http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_events_140819_tnc_
issue_status.pdf.
107. Id.
108. R.J. Lehmann, Blurred Lines: Insurance Challenges the Ride-Sharing Market, R STREET
POLICY STUDY NO. 28, Oct. 2014, at 6–7, http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/R
STREET28.pdf.
109. “R Street institute is a non-profit, non-partisan, public policy research organization . . . .”
About R Street, R STREET INST., http://www.rstreet.org/about/why-r-street/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2015); see Andrew G. Simpson, Insurance Think Tank Splits from Heartland, Reorganizes as R
Street Institute, INS. J. (May 30, 2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/05/
30/249244.htm (“While advocating for free markets, R Street will strive to be pragmatic in its
recommendations.”).
110. Lehmann, supra note 108, at 7. R
111. Id. at 6.
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F. Courts’ and Legislators’ General Responses to Ride-Sharing
Technology, Liability, and Standard of Care
Traditional taxi services fall within the definition of a public com-
mon carrier; however, the TNCs dispute whether ride-sharing drivers
should be considered common carriers.  Still, courts do not seem con-
vinced of the TNCs’ arguments.  In City of Columbus v. Uber Tech-
nologies,112 for example, the Ohio Franklin County Municipal Court
clearly stated that “additional evidence [was] necessary to convince
the Court that [Uber Technology was] not engaged in carrying the
general public.”113  In addition to courts’ vague responses, the legisla-
tures still have not given a clear indication of how to decide this
issue.114
Adding to the confusion, TNCs, such as Uber, maintain that they
are technology companies that provide customers with a tool to intro-
duce them to third-party drivers.115  Thus, Uber argues that it does not
employ drivers and cannot be categorized as a transportation carrier;
instead, Uber defines itself as a request tool.116  Uber also maintains
that UberX drivers are not engaged in “carrying the public gener-
ally”117 but only serve registered, accepted members of Uber’s online
community who have agreed to Uber’s terms and conditions, which
explicitly state that “Uber is a request tool, not a transportation
carrier.”118
While courts have not yet directly addressed the issue of an applica-
ble standard of care, many courts are not convinced that ride-sharing
companies are not engaged in carrying the public, and they have de-
nied motions to dismiss regarding claims of licensure misrepresenta-
tion.119  Several lawsuits have been filed, one of which is a wrongful
death action against Uber and one of its drivers.120  As mentioned
112. No. 2014 EVH 060125, 2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 11 (Mun. Ct. Apr. 30, 2014).
113. Id. at *6.
114. See, e.g., McKinney, supra note 14. R
115. Ward, supra note 4, at 14. R
116. Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 1338144, at *5
(D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2014).
117. City of Columbus, 2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 11, at *5.
118. Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc., 2014 WL 1338144, at *5.
119. See, e.g., Bost. Cab Dispatch v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 1338148
at *6 (D. Mass. March 27, 2014) (agreeing with the magistrate judge that “Uber’s argument was
based on an unduly narrow conception of the term ‘operating’” and that there was “sufficient
evidence that Uber exercised control over . . . vehicles-for-hire”); City of Columbus, 2014 Ohio
Misc. LEXIS 11, at *6–7 (“[A]dditional evidence is necessary to convince the Court that the
Defendants are not engaged in carrying the general public.”).
120. Harrison Weber, As Uber Battles 13 Lawsuits, Cabbies & State Agencies Are Out for
Blood (Update), VENTUREBEAT, http://venturebeat.com/2014/05/08/as-uber-battles-13-lawsuits-
cabbies-state-agencies-are-out-for-blood/ (last updated May 8, 2014, 10:20 AM).
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supra, a tragic accident occurred on New Years Eve 2013 in which an
Uber driver killed a six-year-old on his way to pick up a passenger.121
The complaint alleged that Uber’s business model was responsible for
the accident because Uber required its drivers to respond to ride re-
quests within minutes or otherwise lose the client.122  In addition,
prosecutors in San Francisco claimed that ride-sharing companies
were in violation of several municipal and state laws and were pre-
pared to file a restraining order against the TNCs.123  Considering the
courts’ tentative responses, it appears as if they would be inclined to
view TNCs and their drivers as common carriers in the absence of
legislation stating otherwise.  For example, in City of Columbus, the
Franklin County Municipal Court stated that “additional evidence is
necessary to convince the Court that the Defendants are not engaged
in carrying the general public.”124 Moreover, in Boston Cab Dispatch
Inc. v. Uber Techs Inc.,125 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts affirmed a magistrate judge’s decision that “Uber exer-
cises control over . . . vehicles-for-hire” comparable to that of tradi-
tional taxi services.126
Administrative courts have given similar responses.127  For example,
two administrative law judges in Pennsylvania found that both Lyft
and Uber lacked the required brokerage licenses and demanded that
these ride-sharing companies stop their services in the Pittsburgh area,
which prompted the creation of S.B. 1457.128  In addition, as noted
supra, the Maryland Public Service Commission recently held an ad-
ministrative proceeding that determined that “Uber is a common car-
rier within the meaning prescribed by [Public Utilities Act] § 1-
101(e)(1)” because Uber is engaged in the public transportation of
persons for hire.”129
121. Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 1. R
122. Complaint for Damages & Demand for Trial by Jury at 6, 8, Liu v. Uber Techs., Inc. (No.
CGC-14-536979), 2014 WL 285058.
123. See, e.g., Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42063, at
*17 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014); City of Columbus v. Uber Techs., No. 2014 EVH 060125, 2014
Ohio Misc. LEXIS 11, *6–7 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Apr. 30, 2014).
124. City of Columbus, 2014 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 11, at *6–7.
125. No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 14WL1338148 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014).
126. Id..
127. See, e.g., Packel, supra note 13. R
128. Id. (noting that the bill has been referred to the senate consumer protection and profes-
sional licensure committee and at this time has not been voted on).
129. Order of Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, supra note 12, at 17–18 (quoting MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. UTIL. § 1-101(e)(1), (x)(1) (LexisNexis 2015)).
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Although some states, such as Texas, struggle with the decision of
whether to embrace or ban ride-sharing companies,130 several other
states have responded with ride-sharing friendly legislation.131  On
one hand, proposed bills in the District of Columbia132 and Penn-
sylvania133 explicitly exclude TNCs and ride-sharing drivers from com-
mon carrier definitions.  Realizing their “[constituents’ interest] in
ride-sharing and . . . transportation alternatives,” D.C. and Penn-
sylvania legislators responded to the courts’ rulings by proposing ride-
sharing friendly legislation.134  To address public safety concerns, the
D.C. and Pennsylvania legislation require ride-sharing companies to
keep detailed records, establish driver training programs, enforce a
zero-tolerance alcohol and drug policy, keep a record of complaints,
and create a complaint recording and background check system.135
The Pennsylvania bill also establishes insurance requirements, such as
minimum insurance policy limits, and defines the service standards of
TNCs.136
On the other hand, former Illinois Governor Pat Quinn vetoed an
antiride-sharing bill, H.B. 4075, and cautioned lawmakers not to rush
to create a new statewide regulation before the need and scope for
this regulation was clearly defined.137  If it had passed, H.B. 4075
would have imposed strict requirements for ride-sharing services, such
as distinctive registration plates issued by the Illinois Secretary of
State, and would have required “vehicle[s] used for commercial
ridesharing arrangements . . . [to] pass any safety inspections . . . [that]
the unit of local government . . . [requires] for vehicles used in trans-
porting passengers for-hire” and, thus, would have closely aligned
ride-sharing services to transportation services traditionally viewed as
common carriers.138  In his decision, Quinn acknowledged the con-
sumers’ needs and interests and, in a message to lawmakers, he stated:
“To rush into a whole new statewide regulatory network before the
need for one is clear would not only stifle innovation, it would be a
disservice to consumers who utilize the service while setting a troub-
130. Robert Wilonsky, Here’s How Dallas Wants To Regulate Cabs, Uber and Lyft. Now, Tell
City Hall What You Think About the New Rules, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Aug. 9, 2014, 8:21
AM), http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2014/08/heres-how-dallas-wants-to-regulate-cabs-uber-
and-lyft-now-tell-city-hall-what-you-think-about-the-new-rules.html/.
131. See, e.g., Packel, supra note 13. R
132. S.B. 1457, 198th Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013).
133. B20-0445, 20th Counc. (D.C. 2013).
134. Packel, supra note 13 (quoting Sen. Wayne Fontona).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. McKinney, supra note 14. R
138. H.B. 4075, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
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ling precedent for the future.”139  Alternatively, Chicago alderman
demanded regular drug testing for ride-sharing operators through spe-
cial licensures, mimicking that of taxi medallion requirements.140  The
variety of categorizations and different approaches in courtrooms, as
well as the capitol hills of many states, describe a need for clarity and
guidance.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Considerations for Courts: The Effects of the Common Carrier
Standard of Care on the Ride-Sharing Business Model
A ride-sharing driver’s liability should be assessed under a lesser
standard of care even though courts should generally apply a uniform
standard of care to commercial driving activities.   Moreover, the Illi-
nois legislature should pass a bill excluding ride-sharing services from
common carrier definitions and imposing ride-sharing friendly
regulation.
The main purpose of ride-sharing is deeply rooted in one of the core
principles of peer-to-peer services and the sharing-economy: the free-
dom to profit from unused assets.141  Botsman and Rogers argued that
the sharing economy not only “extend[s] the life of a product” but
creates a benefit to the environment by replacing “individually owned
product[s] with often limited usage” with “a shared service that maxi-
mizes its utility.”142  Alongside this notion, the very basic inspiration
of Zimride and the purpose of the ride-sharing revolution was to max-
imize utilities and efficiencies of cars by filling empty seats through
the use of technology.143  And, most importantly, consumers continue
to embrace and appreciate ride-sharing services due to their conve-
nience, cheaper fares, and necessity.144  For better or worse, the de-
mand for, and popularity of, ride-sharing services is steadily
growing.145  In considering public policy, courts should ask what
139. McKinney, supra note 14 (quoting former Illinois Governor Pat Quinn). R
140. Fran Spielman, Alderman Wants Mandatory Drug Testing for Ride-Sharing Drivers, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, http://politics.suntimes.com/article/chicago/alderman-wants-manda
tory-drug-testing-ride-sharing-drivers/wed-09102014-1001am.
141. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.
142. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 72. R
143. Gustin, supra note 49. R
144. Stuart, supra note 5.  Stuart points out that “[w]e exist in a convenience-driven society R
that’s generally embraced rideshare apps with enthusiasm . . . .  Uber and its ilk have made
hailing a ride, not to mention paying a reasonably low fare, as easy as a couple of swipes on a
smartphone screen.” Id.
145. Lauri Segall, Uber CEO: ‘Our growth Is Unprecedented’, CNN MONEY (June 12, 2014,
8:32 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/06/12/technology/innovation/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick/.  In
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serves the public’s best interest.146  Applying a common carrier stan-
dard of care would not only limit the public’s freedom to contract but
would have a detrimental effect on ride-sharing fares and complicate
answers to insurance questions.147
1. Freedom of Contract
Although safety is most certainly important, a consumer’s freedom
and ability to contract should not be dismissed.148  Moreover, a per-
son’s liberty and autonomy to contract is a significant policy consider-
ation for courts and contract law. 149  Freedom of contract should only
be limited when the contract violates law or public policy or when it
places the general public at risk.150  Thus, courts and legislators must
generally create a balance between restricting an individual’s freedom
to form an agreement and the public “good of the community.”151
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts recommends that courts use a
balancing test that weighs several factors, including the parties’ expec-
tations and whether nonenforcement will further a particular public
policy to determine whether to enforce a contract.152  Additionally,
an interview, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick stated that his company is worth more than $18 billion
and continues to grow. Id.
146. See, e.g., 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.3 (rev. ed. 2003).  “Public policy is the present
concept of public welfare or general good.”  Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383
S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964).
147. See Lehmann, supra note 108, at 12–13. R
148. See generally 15 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79.4 (discussing the principles and policy rea-
sons supporting the freedom to contract).
149. Id. Professor Corbin acknowledges that “[w]hile the freedom of contract continues to be
a valued commodity and remains of vital concern, the twentieth century has been a time of
balancing that freedom with other public interests and goals.” Id.  However, while “[c]ourts also
continue to refuse to enforce contracts because enforcement contradicts a public policy . . . .
[C]ourts of today seem reticent to refuse to enforce contracts unless the public policy of the
jurisdiction is fairly clear.” Id.
150. Id. § 79.1.
151. Werdehoff v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 600 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  Specifically the
Restatement suggests:
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the parties’ justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliber-
ate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.
Id.
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the doctrine of unconscionability considers the parties’ bargaining
power to contract and the existence of each party’s “meaningful
choice.”153
After installing a ride-sharing app, each customer must agree to the
TNC’s terms and conditions before being allowed to register with the
particular ride-sharing platform and be accepted as a member of the
ride-sharing community.154  In accepting the TNC’s terms and condi-
tions, customers are notified that their ride-sharing driver may be a
lay person and not a traditional taxi driver.  Further, the terms and
conditions advise all consumers to “use their own judgment” and util-
ize the services at their own risk.155  All three major TNCs (Lyft, Side-
car, and Uber): (1) use plain language to describe their terms and
conditions; (2) highlight especially relevant information, such as using
the services at the user’s own risk in all capital letters; and (3) inform
customers at the beginning of the terms about key aspects of the ride-
sharing service agreement, for instance that the respective TNC does
not guarantee the rider’s safety.156  Moreover, all three TNCs directly
address the reader using the word “you,” and separate the terms and
conditions into short paragraphs.157  Furthermore, users of ride-shar-
ing apps possess equal bargaining power because riders have alterna-
tive modes of transportation to choose from, such as traditional taxi
services or public transportation.  In fact, all three TNCs specifically
153. See 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4 (2002); see also MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 98 (3d
ed. 1990).
154. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Uber Techs., No. 2014 EVH 060125, 2014 Ohio Misc.
LEXIS 11, at *5–6 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Apr. 30, 2014).  Uber argued that UberX drivers “only serve
register members that [all] have agreed to Uber’s terms and conditions and have been accepted
as a member of Uber’s online community.” Id..
155. See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.lyft.com/terms (inform-
ing its customers that if they “do no agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this
Agreement, you may not use or access the Lyft Platform or the Services,” and that “Lyft is not
responsible for the conduct . . . of any User of the Lyft Platform or Services.  You are solely
responsible for your interactions with other users.”); Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://
www.uber.com/en-US/legal/usa/terms (last updated Apr. 8, 2015) (“UBER DOES NOT GUAR-
ANTEE THE QUALITY, SUITABILITY, SAFETY, OR ABILITY OF THIRD PARTY
PROVIDERS.  YOU AGREE THAT THE ENTIRE RISK ARISING OUT OF YOUR USE
OF THE SERVICES, AND ANY SERVICE OR GOOD REQUESTED IN CONNECTION
THEREWITH, REMAINS SOLELY WITH YOU, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMIT-
TED UNDER APPLICABLE LAW.”).
156. See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 155; Terms and Conditions, supra note 155; R
Terms of Service, SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr/policies/terms-of-services/ (last visited Dec. 29,
2015).
157. See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 155; Terms and Conditions, supra note 155; R
Terms of Service, supra note 156. R
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tell the consumer not to use the respective service if the consumer
does not agree with the TNC’s terms and conditions.158
Allowing consumers to choose whether they want to risk their
safety is not a novel concept.  Consumers routinely contract with busi-
nesses and service providers to engage in certain activities with even
greater risk of injury, releasing these businesses and service providers
from liability.  For example, if consumers want to join a gym, go
skydiving, or go horseback riding, they are required to agree to the
respective business’s terms of service and are often required to sign an
exculpatory agreement.159  Although ride-sharing services may have a
greater reach in affecting the general public than, for example, skydiv-
ing services, the principles of risk taking, choice, and consumer auton-
omy underlying both services are not substantially different.160  In
both activities, the consumer is aware of a potential risk: ride-sharing
consumers are aware that their driver may be a lay person and that
the respective TNC creating the match between the consumer and
rider does not guarantee safety; similarly, skydivers are aware that
jumping out of an airplane may result in injuries and that the skydiv-
ing school cannot guarantee safety.161  Moreover, both activities re-
quire the consumer to evaluate the potential risk and to choose
whether to engage in the activity.162
Although ride-sharing services may negatively affect the public as a
whole,163 ride-sharing services also benefit the public as a whole, even
those who chose not to take advantage of the ride-sharing services
directly. For example, ride-sharing services may help reduce the
158. See Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 155; Terms and Conditions, supra note 155; Terms R
of Service, supra note 156. R
159. See, e.g., Patricia Kussmann, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement Exempting
Operator of Fitness or Health Club or Gym from Liability for Personal Injury or Death of Patron,
61 A.L.R.6th 147 (2011); Douglas Leslie, Sports Liability Waiver and Transactional Unconscio-
nability, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L 341 (2004).
160. See generally Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42
EMORY L.J. 1, 8–11 (1993) (discussing the subjective perceptions of risk and its effect on per-
sonal choices in modern society).
161. See id. at 27.
162. See id. at 10.  Professor Judges further argued that, “[u]ltimately, an essential component
of the concept of  . . . ‘risk evaluation’ . . . is subjective and normative: only each individual can
define for himself or herself what is ‘undesirable’” and that choice of risks is “an important
component of both individual and social self-realization.” Id. at 11, 22.
163. See, e.g., Chase Cain & Wire Servs., Uber Driver Arrested in San Francisco Crash That
Killed Girl, NBC BAY AREA, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Uber-Driver-Arrested-in-
San-Francisco-Crash-That-Killed-Girl-238491691.html (last updated Jan. 15, 2014, 6:27 PM)
(describing how an Uber driver struck and killed a six-year-old pedestrian crossing an intersec-
tion); Sergio Quintana, Uber Driver Crash in SF Raises New Safety Issues, ABC7NEWS.COM (Aug.
4, 2014), http://abc7news.com/business/uber-driver-crash-in-sf-raises-new-safety-issues/240891/
(describing an Uber driver who suffered from a seizure while driving and struck a pedestrian).
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amount of vehicles on the street.164  Traffic accidents are on the rise
and are a harsh reality: the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Na-
tional Highway Safety Administration reported 29,989 fatal automo-
bile accidents in 2014.165  Moreover, a 2015 newsletter released by the
National Highway Safety Administration noted that “[i]n 2013, 4,735
pedestrians were killed and an estimated 66,000 were injured in traffic
crashes” and also observed that “[o]n average, a pedestrian was killed
every 2 hours and injured every 8 minutes in traffic crashes.”166  In
2014, the U.S. Department of Transportation reported 269,294,302
registered vehicles in the United States.167  These numbers suggest
that the more vehicles participate in traffic, the greater the risk of ac-
cidents.168  Furthermore, a total of 31% of fatal accidents resulted
from alcohol-impaired driving.169  Ride-sharing services actually help
alleviate this problem because the core goal of ride-sharing is to re-
duce the amount of cars on the street by using cars more efficiently
and filling empty seats.170  More importantly, with a less expensive
alternative to taxis, individuals may be inclined to leave their personal
motor vehicles at home.171  Additionally, each TNC has a zero toler-
ance policy for alcohol and drug use for its drivers.172  Again, because
ride sharing is a less expensive alternative to existing options, intoxi-
cated individuals may be more inclined to leave their vehicles at
home, thus reducing the risk of traffic accidents.173  Finally, some the-
164. See Gustin, supra note 49. R
165. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN. DOT HS 812 234, QUICK
FACTS 2014 at 1 (Jan. 2016), [hereinafter QUICK FACTS 2014], http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Pubs/812234.pdf.
166. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 812 124, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: PEDESTRIANS, at 1
(Feb. 2015), http://www.nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812124.pdf.
167. QUICK FACTS 2014, supra note 174 at 1.
168. JUSTIN A. HEINONEN & JOHN E. ECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PEDESTRIAN INJURIES
AND FATALITIES, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDES SERIES
NO. 51, at 13 (Oct. 2007) (“[M]ost pedestrian injuries and fatalities occur in urban areas, un-
doubtedly in part because cities have both more vehicles and more pedestrians when compared
with non-urban areas.”).
169. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN. DOT HS 812 231, TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS: ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 7 tbl.4 (Dec. 2015).
170. Gustin, supra note 49. R
171. See, e.g., Sara Silverstein, These Animated Charts Tell You Everything About Uber Prices
in 21 Cities, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-vs-
taxi-pricing-by-city-2014-10.  In an anecdotal study, Business Insider compared Uber fares with
taxi fares in twenty-one different cities across the United States and concluded that using UberX
was generally cheaper, especially as the speed of the ride increased. Id.
172. See, e.g., Lyft Terms of Service, supra note 155; Terms and Conditions, supra note 155; R
Terms of Service, supra note 156. R
173. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTA-
TION PROGRAMS: A COUNTERMEASURE FOR REDUCING IMPAIRED DRIVING (Sept. 2009) (com-
paring a variety of “alternative transportation programs” aimed at reducing the frequency of
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL203.txt unknown Seq: 21  2-AUG-16 10:10
2016] THE COMMON CARRIER BARRIER 893
orists suggest that carrying a passenger may incline a driver to drive
more cautiously than without a passenger.174
In sum, the benefits of ride sharing outweigh the risks, most impor-
tantly by allowing consumers to independently assess risks in ex-
change for benefits.175  This independence and choice for risk is “an
important component of both individual and social self-realization.”176
2. Craigslist and Dating Websites: Past Examples of Putting
Consumers’ Demands First
Similar to the ride-sharing revolution, Craigslist and dating websites
transformed economic and matchmaking markets in the mid-
nineties.177  Craigslist is an online marketplace, “allowing users to post
and view ads pertaining to diverse subject matters.”178  Comparably,
dating websites, such as eHarmony and Match.com, function as
matchmaking platforms to customers seeking relationships.179  Al-
though both Craigslist and dating websites have been welcomed and
embraced by the general public, they had their fair share of downsides
regarding public safety concerns and consumer needs.180  These con-
cerns included fraudulent activities, solicitation of prostitution, and
sex trafficking.181
Courts applied common law standards in deciding defamation suits
concerning “third-party internet postings.”182  These common law
standards held publishers of this content “to a higher standard than
mere distributors like telephone and telegraph companies.”183  Under
the common law standard, “hosting internet service providers,” such
impaired driving and noting that “private taxi systems are far more flexible than mass transit
systems, but they can be quite costly and they require more individual initiative and planning
[because] the trip to the drinking locations must be made without using personal vehicles”).
174. See infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text (discussing the Moral Hazard Theory).
175. See Judges, supra note 160, at 27. R
176. Id. at 26.
177. See Ryan D. O’Day, Note, Rapists, Sexual Offenders, and Child Molesters: Who Is Your
Romantic “Match”? Why Dating Websites Should Perform Criminal Background Checks, 48
VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 331 (2013).
178. Peter Adamo, Comment, Craigslist, the CDA, and Inconsistent International Standards
Regarding Liability for Third-Party Postings on the Internet, PACE INT’L. L. REV. ONLINE COM-
PANION, Feb. 2011, at 1, 1 (Supp.).
179. Lindsey A. Datte, Note, Chaperoning Love Online: Online Dating Liability and the Wa-
vering Application of CDA § 230, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 769, 770 (2014).
180. Adamo, supra note 178, at 1–2; O’Day, supra note 177, at 330. R
181. See, e.g., Datte, supra note 179, at 776–77 (describing the potential of dating scams); R
Melissa Farley, et al., Online Prostitution and Trafficking, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1039, 1040–41, 1047
(2014).
182. See, e.g., Adamo, supra note 178, at 3 (discussing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. R
Supp. 135).
183. Id.
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as Craigslist and Match.com, “could be held liable upon notice of and
failure to remove defamatory content.”184 In Cubby, Inc. v. Com-
puServe, Inc.,185 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York was the first court to acknowledge that common law defa-
mation standards could not apply to hosting Internet service provid-
ers.186  However, disagreements among lower courts187 led Congress
to enact the Communications Decency Act (CDA).188  Section 230 of
the CDA specifically “kept internet content services . . . from being
considered publishers of third party content under law.” 189
Even without an applicable common law standard of liability,
Craigslist and dating websites remained a staple in the online commu-
nity.190  In particular, “online dating now stands as the third most pop-
ular form of matchmaking in the United States.”191  Indeed, online
dating has revolutionized the way people connect and interact.192
“[A]ccording to recent studies, seventeen percent of marriages [in
2013] were between couples that met on the Internet.”193  Even
though online dating has raised safety concerns, such as one dater
physically harming or financially exploiting another dater, only a few
states and jurisdictions “regulate online dating sites.”194  Moreover,
“[m]ost of these laws focus on issues such as unfair contracts and pro-
cedures rather than safety.”195  Those states (including Illinois) that do
address safety concerns “mandate notification of whether the [online
dating] service screens participants and, if so, what it searches for and
how they use the information[,]” instead of requiring the online dating
184. Id.
185. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
186. Id. at 139–41; Adamo, supra note 178, at 3. R
187. See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995) (holding that under certain circumstances, the common law defamation standard
should apply to hosting Internet service providers) superseded by statute, Communications De-
cency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 47 U.S.C.), as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y.
2011).
188. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
189. Adamo, supra note 178, at 6 (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- R
104, 110 Stat. 56 (Cox-Wyden Proposal codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230)).
190. Datte, supra note 179, at 773 (“[A] study conducted in 2013 concluded that 38% of single R
adult Internet users looking for love—or about one in ten adults—experienced online dating in
some form.”).
191. Id. at 769.
192. Phyllis Coleman, Online Dating: “Murderers, Rapists, and Con Artists, Oh My,” 13 APPA-
LACHIAN J.L. 147, 147 (2014).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 184.
195. Id.
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sites to perform background checks.196  Additionally, the Illinois In-
ternet Dating, Internet Child Care, Internet Senior Care, and Internet
Home Care Safety Act (Illinois Internet Dating Safety Act)197 in-
structs online dating services to “provide a safety awareness notifica-
tion to all Illinois members that includes, at a minimum, a list and
description of safety measures reasonably designed to increase aware-
ness of safer dating.”198  Thus, the statute assures that consumers are
informed but ultimately leaves the choice to engage in these activities
to the consumers.199
Similarly, TNCs also function as matchmakers by connecting people
seeking a ride with drivers seeking a rider.200  Both online dating sites
and TNCs serve as platforms to connect two strangers with a common
goal: ride-sharing users search for transportation, and dating website
users attempt to find a date or companionship.201  Safety concerns
among ride-sharing and online dating users are similar: both platforms
connect two strangers with one another.202  Despite these safety con-
cerns, however, both service providers enable an “exchange . . . be-
tween [two] consenting entities.”203  Taking their approach to online
dating as a guide, Illinois legislators should focus on assuring that con-
sumers are enabled to make informed decisions when choosing ride-
sharing services by, for example, requiring that TNCs provide con-
sumers with safety awareness notifications similar to those required by
the Illinois Internet Dating Safety Act.204  In passing ride-sharing
friendly legislation, the Illinois legislature can once again create
awareness by enabling consumers to be mindful of consequences
when they assess the risks they consider taking.205
196. Id. at 184–85.
197. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 518 (Supp. 2015).
198. Id. at 518/10.
199. See id. The statute outlines specific examples of safety notification, such as “[t]here is no
substitute for acting with caution when communicating with any stranger who wants to meet
you[,]” but ultimately allows for the online dating service provider to choose the exact wording
and to determine safe practices. Id.
200. Browning, supra note 6, at 84. R
201. See Ward, supra note 4. R
202. See Tanz, supra note 37. R
203. Arun Sundararajan, Why the Government Doesn’t Need To Regulate the Sharing Econ-
omy, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/10/from-airbnb-to-coursera-
why-the-government-shouldnt-regulate-the-sharing-economy/.
204. See, e.g., Code of Conduct, UBER https://www.uber.com/safety/code-of-conduct (last up-
dated Jan. 18, 2016).  Uber provides a code of conduct to its users and drivers, which includes “a
shared standard for respect, accountability, and common courtesy” as well as requirements to
ensure safety. Id.  See generally 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 518/10.
205. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 518/2 (“There is a public safety need . . . to increase public
awareness of the possible risks associated with Internet dating . . . .”).
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B. Considerations for the Illinois Legislator: Benefits of
Ride-Sharing Services
The Illinois legislature should affirmatively pass a bill excluding
ride-sharing services from common carrier definitions and imposing
ride-sharing friendly regulations.  Specifically, in considering a ride-
sharing friendly bill, the Illinois legislature should follow California’s
and Colorado’s ride-sharing friendly legislation by: (1) expressly ex-
cluding TNCs and ride-sharing services from the public carrier and
common carrier standard of care; (2) creating a specific TNC cate-
gory; and (3) allowing the Illinois Public Utility Commission to regu-
late ride-sharing services within express boundaries of the statute.206
On August 25, 2014, former Illinois Governor Pat Quinn vetoed the
proposed ride-sharing bill H.B. 4075, cautioning lawmakers not to
“rush into a whole new statewide regulatory network before the need
for one is clear [because such a measure] would not only stifle innova-
tion, it would be a disservice to consumers who utilize the service
while setting a troubling precedent for the future.”207  The proposed
bill would have placed ride-sharing services in the same category as
traditional taxi and livery services.208  Moreover, the bill would have
limited the amount of ride-sharing drivers on the road through a regis-
tration plate system, which would have essentially mimicked the taxi
medallion system.209  In essence, the Illinois legislature attempted to
regulate the new ride-sharing innovation with an already problematic
system.210  New technology undoubtedly presents unique challenges
to twenty-first century regulators, requiring them to “balance [the]
risk and the potential harm to human health and the environment
against the demand of citizens for new technologies and the benefits
206. See Emily Dobson, Transportation Network Companies: How Should South Carolina Ad-
just Its Regulatory Framework, 66 S.C. L. REV. 701, 709 (2015) (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§§ 5433–40 (West Supp. 2014) and COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-10.1-601 to 608 (2014)).
207. McKinney, supra note 14. R
208. H.B. 4075, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
209. See id. (“The Secretary of State shall issue for every passenger car used as a taxicab, or
livery, or in a commercial ride-sharing arrangement in which the driver participates in commer-
cial ride-sharing arrangements for more than 18 hours per week, distinctive registration plates.”);
Stephen Schlickman, If You Want Real Ride-sharing Alternatives, Veto Those Bills, Gov. Quinn,
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (July 29, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140729/OPINION/
140729776/if-you-want-real-ride-sharing-alternatives-veto-those-bills-gov-quinn.
210. See Jeff Horwitz & Chris, Taken for a Ride, SLATE (June 6, 2012), http://www.slate.com/
articles/business/moneybox/2012/06/taxi_medallions_how_new_york_s_terrible_taxi_system_
makes_fares_higher_and_drivers_poorer_.html (criticizing the taxi medallion system and calling
it a “lose-lose scenario” through which “New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and a host of other
cities have created a powerful investor class, medallion owners and financiers, whose interests
routinely compete with those of drivers and passengers”).
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that they bring.”211  This balance often results in vague regulations
and hastily made decisions because regulators are pressured by heav-
ily regulated markets.212  Despite this pressure, regulators and legisla-
tors should not overregulate new technology because overregulation
may stifle innovation.213  New technology and innovation often create
a “positive supply shock: technological advances drop the price of a
good or service, thereby boosting output and consumption.  As the
market opens up, more people can afford to supply and consume the
good or service.”214
By proposing consumer friendly legislation and ordinances, legisla-
tors and city officials will open the door to a dialogue with ride-shar-
ing companies and ride-sharing operators.215 This dialogue is more
beneficial than an outright ban because it respects and considers con-
sumer needs and may even create a proactive regulation model for
future inventions and concepts.216  Safety standards are certainly im-
portant and should always be a public official’s concern.  However, if
safety concerns become a measure to stifle innovation and resemble
protectionism of an overregulated industry, these concerns fail their
purpose by not serving the public’s best interest.217  A proposed bill in
Pennsylvania, for example, established insurance requirements, such
as minimum insurance policy limits, and defined the service standards
of TNCs.218  In doing so, legislators communicate clear standards to
courts, TNCs, ride-sharing drivers, and the general public, as well as
enable ride-sharing services to function more efficiently.  Clear stan-
dards manage consumers’ and providers’ expectations, and instead of
211. Faure et al., supra note 18, at 283 (abstract). R
212. Id. at 288; see Badger, supra note 46. R
213. See Browning, supra note 6, at 85 (“These are 21st century businesses that are operating R
with 20th century laws.” (quoting Emily Badger, The Strange Tale of an Uber Car Crash and
What It Means for the Future of Auto Insurance, CITYLAB (Sept. 10, 2013), http://
www.citylab.com/commute/2013/09/real-future-ride-sharing-may-all-come-down-insurance/6832/
)); see also WILLIAM D. EGGERS & PAUL MACMILLAN, THE SOLUTION REVOLUTION: HOW BUSI-
NESS, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISES ARE TEAMING UP TO SOLVE SOCIETY’S
TOUGHEST PROBLEMS 57 (2013) .
214. EGGERS & MACMILLAN, supra note 213. R
215. See Packel, supra note 13. R
216. See id.  Professor Faure puts the regulatory flexibility and uncertainness of standards in a
criminal context, arguing that regulation with criminal sanctions demands foreseeability and cer-
tainty for the regulatee.  Faure et al., supra note 18, at 289.  Although ride-sharing legislation is R
unlikely to pose criminal sanctions on the consumer, this Comment proposes that foreseeability
and certainty is of equal value to the ride-sharing driver and rider.
217. Badger, supra note 46; see Stuart, supra note 5. R
218. Packel, supra note 13 (discussing the circumstances of the introduction of the bill and its R
intended provisions).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL203.txt unknown Seq: 26  2-AUG-16 10:10
898 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:873
fighting lawsuits that suffer due to a lack of clarity and regulations,
TNCs can focus on maximizing their service to the public.219
The ride-sharing friendly legislation should entail an individual
standard and category for TNCs and ride-sharing drivers.220  Califor-
nia’s and Colorado’s ride-sharing friendly legislation could serve as a
guide.221  Similar to the California legislature, the Illinois legislature
should create a separate TNC category and define TNCs as well as
ride sharing by expressly excluding TNCs and ride sharing from public
carriers and the common carrier standard of care.222  These definitions
should mimic California’s definition of a TNC as “a company or or-
ganization operating in [Illinois] that provides transportation services
using an online-enabled platform to connect passengers with drivers
using their personal, non-commercial vehicles.”223  By operating in the
TNC category, ride-sharing organizations could be required to register
with each city’s respective regulatory commission, provide commercial
liability policies, and take affirmative steps to insure the riders’ and
drivers’ safety.224  These affirmative steps should involve a zero-toler-
ance policy for drugs and alcohol, require and provide yearly vehicle
inspections of the drivers’ cars, and involve yearly safety trainings and
workshops.225
While taxi companies continue to insist that ride-sharing companies
pose a threat to public safety, there is little to no evidence that li-
censed taxi drivers are actually safer than ride-sharing operators.226
In fact, one anecdotal study found that taxi-lessees had a substantially
worse driving performance than taxi-owners.227  The researcher ex-
plained this outcome using the moral hazard theory.  According to the
219. See Faure et al., supra note 18, at 289. R
220. See Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulation Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation: Examin-
ing the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15 PGH. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, 97 (2014).
221. Id.
222. See id. at 91.
223. See id. (quoting CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF LIMOUSINE AND TRANS-
PORTATION NETWORK COMPANY REGULATIONS (June 2014), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdon
lyres/208D6DD5-F4A3-4A66-8B7C-65CDB0F4265E/0/TNCLimoRegulation_v1.pdf).
224. See id. at 91–92.
225. See id.
226. Simon Waxman, Opinion, Uber vs. Taxis, BOS. GLOBE, May, 23 2014, http://www.boston
globe.com/opinion/2014/05/23/podium-uber/qDzgxr7of6vBP805aGNohN/story.html (“[The Bos-
ton Police] say they receive 10 to 15 complaints about cab drivers every day, according to a
report commissioned by the city and released in October of last year. . . .  According to that same
report, cabs respond to only 78 percent of dispatch requests in Boston.”).
227. Henry Schneider, Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City
Taxi Industry, 53 J. LAW & ECON. 783, 784 (2010) (“In 2005, long-term lessees experienced 62
percent more accidents and 64 percent more driving violations per mile than did owner-
drivers . . . .”).
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moral hazard theory, people may have an incentive to take a greater
risk if there is a chance that they will not be held liable for their ac-
tions.228  The researcher illustrated that lessees pay “less or none of
many of the variable costs that they generate, including for vehicle
maintenance, repair, replacement, and insurance, and hence they have
incentives to choose inefficient levels of vehicle care and risk.”229  Al-
though a leasing option exists for traditional taxi drivers, all three ma-
jor TNCs require their drivers to own the vehicles they will use for
their ride-sharing services.230  Following the moral hazard theory,
ride-sharing drivers who own their own vehicles are, therefore, likely
to use more caution while driving.231
Dismantled by safety concerns, the primary purpose of taxi-service
lobbyists appears to be maintaining the value of the taxi medallion.232
With ride-sharing services entering the market, taxi medallions are
rapidly losing their value, which leaves investors and taxi medallion
owners concerned—not with regard to passengers’ safety, but with re-
gard to the profit of their investments.233  Indeed, Chicago taxi medal-
lion prices have steadily declined in their value, hitting an all-time low
in July 2014, when the medallions were estimated at a median price of
$250,000 compared to $357,000 in April 2014.234  The Illinois legisla-
ture should focus on compromises and ride-sharing friendly regulation
because this regulation would benefit society in a utilitarian way: max-
imizing assets through sharing and establishing a “social layer of effi-
ciency on our current transportation infrastructure.”235
IV. IMPACT
Technology will continue to evolve, innovate, and change the play-
ing field for businesses and concepts that are firmly rooted in tradition
and law.236  Society is changing, and the law must adapt to meet these
new societal demands and needs.  If the standard of care and insur-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Driving Jobs vs Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs
(last visited Nov. 14, 2014); Requirements for Lyft Vehicles, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/
articles/214219557 (last visited Nov. 14, 2014); SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr/drivers/ (last visited
Nov. 14, 2014).
231. See Schneider, supra note 227, at 785. R
232. Badger, supra note 46. R
233. Id.
234. CHI. DISPATCHER, CHICAGO MEDALLION PRICES (Sept. 2014), http://chicagodispatcher.
com/clients/chicagodispatcher/September2014MedallionPrices.pdf.
235. Gustin, supra note 49 (quoting John Zimmer). R
236. See Sofia Ranchorda´s, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing
Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 439–40 (2015).
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ance issues are not adequately addressed, ride-sharing services may no
longer be profitable and may cease to exist, which would harm the
public’s interest in obtaining affordable and reliable transportation.237
Technology, combined with the sharing economy, is moving our soci-
ety forward and generates economical as well as environmental bene-
fits.238  Courts and legislators have a great responsibility in shaping the
future of these programs and innovations.239  This Part discusses the
impact of ridesharing on: (1) consumers; (2) ride-sharing drivers’ in-
surance; and (3) the taxi industry.
A. The Impact on Consumers
A consumer’s freedom to choose depends on the available alterna-
tives.  Ride-sharing services offer valuable alternative modes of trans-
portation to consumers, especially in Chicago, because Chicagoans
routinely travel long distances across town.240  For example, consider a
hypothetical ride-sharing user named Jane.  Jane finds herself in the
South Loop neighborhood of Chicago, which is 12.5 miles away from
her home in the Rogers Park neighborhood.  Jane forgot her wallet at
home but has her cell phone.  By choosing ride-sharing services, Jane
has a ride home because her credit card is automatically charged
through her ride-sharing app.  Moreover, in times of economical de-
spair, ride sharing can create greater access to transportation for indi-
viduals who may otherwise be unable to afford traditional taxi
fares.241   The public’s safety and protection should remain a para-
mount concern to regulators and legislators, and consumers should be
provided with an assurance of safety.242  However, if courts too nar-
rowly interpret the law and if legislatures overregulate, innovators
may move on to the next invention.  Customers, however, will be
stripped of a reliable, alternative mode of transportation because ride-
sharing services “increase the overall access to reliable on-demand
transportation services in urban areas.”243
Additionally, ride-sharing drivers, who can also be viewed as con-
sumers of the ride-sharing app, are equally impacted by the lack of
237. See id. at 446–47.
238. Id. at 466; see also K. Casey Strong, Comment, When Apps Pollute: Regulating Transpor-
tation Network Companies To Maximize Environmental Benefits, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1049,
1054 (2015).
239. See Ranchorda´s, supra note 236, at 421. R
240. See Stuart, supra note 5. R
241. See Ranchorda´s, supra note 236, at 435. R
242. See id. at 474 (“[R]egulators [need to] find the balance between the advancement of
innovation and the need to safeguard public safety and health . . . .”).
243. See Strong, supra note 238, at 1071. R
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clear legal guidelines and certainty.  Ride-sharing offers flexible em-
ployment opportunities to many people in search of a job.244  If ride-
sharing drivers were regulated like traditional taxi or commercial driv-
ers, access to this employment may be lost.245  Robert Cooter, a Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, who focuses
on the interaction between law and economics, correctly pointed out
that “freedom requires law, not its absence,” and he also accurately
noted that “the [real] enemy of economy liberty is monopoly, which
only permits a few to seek wealth . . . with restrictive laws, state offi-
cials can . . . choose who is allowed to do business.”246
B. The Impact on Ride-Sharing Drivers’ Insurance
A higher standard of care may lead to insurance issues, such as an
increase in insurance gaps, which may result in discouraging people
from engaging in the ride-sharing business and leave customers under-
served.  Each TNC promises its drivers a $1 million commercial insur-
ance policy;247 however, these commercial policies are intended to
supplement in “excess of loss, riding on top of coverage provided by
the driver’s primary insurer.”248  Additionally, the structure of some
of the TNCs commercial policies creates insurance gaps; for example,
Lyft’s $1 million commercial policy only goes in effect when a driver
has been matched with a passenger.249  This means that when the ride-
sharing driver has the ride-sharing app open but is not matched with a
rider, she is not covered under the TNC’s commercial policy and must
rely on her own personal insurance.250  If, however, the driver’s per-
sonal automobile insurance excludes commercial driving activities and
finds that ride sharing is a commercial driving activity, the driver may
not be covered at all.251  In turn, if courts find that a common carrier
standard of care applies, insurers will likely be more inclined to ex-
244. Lisa Eadicicco, Uber Says It’s Creating 20,000 Jobs Per Month, BUS. INSIDER (June 6,
2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-creating-jobs-2014-6#ixzz3hY5KjReO.
245. See id.
246. Ranchorda´s, supra note 236, at 467–68 (alterations in original) (quoting ROBERT D. R
COOTER, LEGALIZE FREEDOM, in Competition Policy and Patent Law Under Uncertainty: Regu-
lating Innovation, 27, 39 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011)).
247. See, e.g., Nairi, Insurance for UberX with Ridesharing, UBER NEWSROOM (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://newsroom.uber.com/2014/02/insurance-for-uberx-with-ridesharing/; LYFT, https://www.lyft.
com/safety (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
248. Lehmann, supra note 108, at 7. R
249. LYFT, supra note 247 (“This means that from the moment you accept a ride request and R
are on your way to pick up a passenger to the moment you end the ride in the app, Lyft has an
insurance policy for liability up to $1 million per incident.”).
250. Lehmann, supra note 108, at 7–8 (discussing Dave Jones’s, a California Insurance Com- R
missioner, proposed solution).
251. Id. at 8–9.
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clude ride sharing from their personal automobile coverage.252 Al-
though Lyft and Uber offer a contingent liability policy that “will
cover up to $50,000 per-person of bodily injury, $100,000 per-accident
of bodily injury and $25,000 of property damage, in the event a
driver’s personal policy did not respond[,]”253 these damage coverages
may not meet the minimum liability coverage requirement in the par-
ticular city that the ride-sharing driver is operating.  Indeed, the re-
quired minimum liability coverage is much higher for common
carriers and commercial drivers.254  In Chicago, for example, the
mandatory minimum liability coverage for taxicabs is $350,000.255
Thus, if a ride-sharing driver is held to be a common carrier and sub-
jected to a heightened standard of care, it follows that the higher
mandatory minimum liability coverage would apply to ride-sharing
drivers as well.256
As a result, a ride-sharing driver may need to supplement her per-
sonal auto insurance with a more expensive commercial insurance pol-
icy.257  More expensive insurance may have a three-fold effect on the
ride-sharing system as a whole: (1) fare prices may rise; (2) drivers
may be forced to drive longer hours to make a profit; and (3) the
higher rates may prevent people from becoming drivers in the first
place.  Fare prices may rise because the ride-sharing driver may need a
greater incentive to become a ride-sharing driver because drivers cur-
rently take an 80% cut from the total fare and already demand higher
fares.258  Additionally, the City of Chicago recently passed a new ordi-
nance that divides transportation companies’ “ride-sharing driver[s]
into two categories.”259  Under the new ordinance, “companies whose
driver workforce averages more than 20 hours per person each week
will face stronger oversight, including a requirement that all drivers
252. Id. at 12.
253. Id. at 8–9.
254. See Jack Newsham, Uber, Lyft Save Big by Avoiding Regulations, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 25,
2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/12/25/uber-lyft-save-big-avoiding-regulations/
pQAMk1KMOavlyZhWi4XIaJ/story.html.
255. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-112-330(a)(1) (2015) (“Each public liability insurance policy
shall provide at least the following minimum coverage for each taxicab: $350,000.00 combined
single limit coverage per occurrence.”).
256. See Lehmann, supra note 108, at 1. R
257. Id. at 7.
258. E.g., Lazo, supra note 10; Katy Steinmetz, UberX Drivers Protest Outside Uber Head-
quarters, TIME (May 8, 2014), http://time.com/92988/uberx-san-francisco-protest-uber/ (noting
that UberX drivers used to receive 95%).
259. Lehmann, supra note 108, at 9; see also Hal Dardick & Jon Hilkevitch, Chicago Rideshare R
Regulations Approved, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 2014, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
politics/chi-chicago-rideshare-regulations-approved-20140528-story.html.
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obtain chauffeur’s licenses.”260  Companies whose drivers work less
than twenty hours per week, on the other hand, “would be required to
obtain city approval of their background check, driver training, vehi-
cle inspection and random drug testing procedures.”261 Furthermore,
the licensing fee for the former would be substantially higher.262  Al-
though the City of Chicago currently estimates that “the vast majority
of ride-shar[ing] drivers—up to 75 percent—work only part time[,]”263
this may change if ride-sharing drivers are forced to drive longer hours
to make up for higher insurance rates.  One aspect is certain: higher
fares will mainly affect consumers who depend on and take advantage
of ride sharing, which many view as a cheaper and more practical al-
ternative to traditional taxi services.264
Most importantly, the legal uncertainty as to which standard of care
applies to ride-sharing services is stifling the creation of new insurance
policies.265  On May 6, 2014, Lyft announced its partnership with Met-
Life Auto & Home and proposed to develop insurance policies tai-
lored to users of “the sharing economy platform.”266  However, thus
far, “no products from this project [have] been filed in any state.”267
For insurance underwriters to create “hybrid” policies that combine
“features of both personal and commercial auto products[,]” insurers
must know what standard of care applies to what type of driving activ-
ity.268  If courts decide that ride-sharing does not fall under the com-
mon carrier’s heightened standard of care, as they should, insurance
companies could rely on a standard of care that is uniformly applied
to all phases of a ride-sharing activity, and new innovative products
could be tailored accordingly.269  By passing a bill stating that ride-
sharing drivers are not common carriers, the Illinois legislature would
260. Dardick & Hilkevitch, supra note 259. R
261. Id.
262. Lehmann, supra note 108, at 9 (“[T]he licensing fee for [those who work more than 20 R
hours per week] is . . . $25,000.”).
263. Dardick & Hilkevitch, supra note 259. R
264. See Stuart, supra note 5. R
265. See Lehmann, supra note 108, at 12. R
266. Lyft Partners with MetLife, LYFT: BLOG (May 6, 2014), http://blog.lyft.com/posts/2014/5/
5/lyft-partners-with-metlife.
267. Lehmann, supra note 108, at 7. R
268. Id. at 12.
269. Id. at 14. Although Lehmann argued for a uniform coverage requirement that includes
ride-sharing services as for-hire transportation services, he conceded that “[t]here may be good
reasons for some differences in the regulatory treatment of different forms of transportation;”
however, he argued that liability coverage should not be among them. Id. at 13.  This Comment
is not trying to answer whether or not TNCs should be vicariously liable for their drivers but,
rather, proposes that ride-sharing services are distinct from common carriers who are engaged in
transporting the general public.
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create even more legal clarity.  Thus, with clear guidance from the leg-
islature and a sensible approach from the courts, ride sharing may re-
main a matchmaking service that consumers and providers choose to
enjoy.
C. The Impact on the Taxi Industry
Ride-sharing services create competition to existing monopolies and
reduce the value of taxi medallions.  One legal scholar argued that
“[t]reating taxi medallions like property has fostered an undue sense
of entitlement, exacerbating conflict and discouraging innovation.”270
Instead of focusing on eliminating ride-sharing services, the taxi indus-
try would benefit more from trying to improve its competitiveness
with ride-sharing services.271  Perhaps the traditional privilege of taxi
medallions has been outdated and the taxi industry must face a re-
form; as another scholar correctly pointed out: “Different Game +
Same Rules = Game Over.”272  New competition changes the struc-
ture and flow of long-existing traditional businesses.  A clear legal
framework will help the taxi industry adapt to the new competition
and new consumer demands and expectations.273
V. CONCLUSION
Classifying ride-sharing operators as common carriers and applying
the highest standard of care will have a detrimental effect on the ride-
sharing business model because a heightened standard of care would
likely increase insurance premiums for ride-sharing operators and cre-
ate legal uncertainties for new technologies.274  Consumers should be
free to contract and assess safety standards on their own.275  Moreo-
ver, the Illinois legislature should follow its past regulatory approach
to Internet dating to ensure consumers’ awareness of safety standards
through ride-sharing friendly regulation.276  Instead of eliminating
new innovations by relying on old standards, the Illinois legislature
should develop a new standard of care fitted to twenty-first-century
technology.  This ride-sharing standard of care could include regula-
tory mechanisms to ensure basic standards of safety.  For example, the
270. Tom W. Bell, Copyright Porn Trolls, Wasting Taxi Medallions, and the Propriety of
“Property,” 18 CHAP. L. REV. 799, 803 (2015).
271. Dobson, supra note 206, at 722. R
272. Ranchorda´s, supra note 236, at 474. R
273. Id. at 475 (arguing that the sharing economy demands a new legal framework.).
274. See supra notes 141–235 and accompanying text. R
275. See supra notes 148–76 and accompanying text. R
276. See supra notes 177–205 and accompanying text. R
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ride-sharing standard of care could impose certain requirements on
TNCs as well as ride-sharing drivers: TNCs could be required to main-
tain records, enforce zero-tolerance drug and alcohol policies, and
sporadically review ride-sharing drivers via their driving performance.
Furthermore, ride-sharing drivers could be subjected to regular car
inspections, road safety trainings, and maintenance of a good driving
record. Communal benefits and innovations must not be lost to regu-
latory and legal uncertainty.  Legal innovation should be the answer.
Riebana Sachs*
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2016; B.S., Iowa State University, 2010.
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